Youngest Person In Indiana

WARSAW, Ind. (WXIN) — A northern Indiana teenager who was 12 years old when he helped kill his friend's stepfather has a shot at freedom.
Paul Henry Gingerich turned 18 in February, and under a state law that bears his name, a judge can now consider three alternative sentencing options, including Gingerich's release. The judge could also transfer him to adult prison to serve the remainder of his 25-year sentence or place him on probation, home detention or work release.
Gingerich was believed to be the Youngest Person In Indiana to be sentenced as an adult. is case sparked an outcry that led to legislation known as "Paul's Law," which allows alternative sentences for juveniles who commit serious crimes.
Gingerich appeared Friday in a Kosciusko County courtroom for a hearing on those options, the Indianapolis Star reported. Gingerich's attorney, Monica Foster, is asking for probation or home detention. A decision is likely by summer.
Pendleton Juvenile Correctional Facility Superintendent Alison Yancey also testified, speaking about Gingerich's progress while in custody, including his becoming an honor student and his participation in community services.
The Indiana Department of Correction has determined that Gingerich has a low risk of re-offending.

Judge James Heuer called his progress "impressive" but also said he has to consider the victim's family, some of whom attended Friday's hearing.
http://www.aol.com/article/2016/04/25/indiana-teen-who-killed-man-at-age-12-gets-shot-at-freedom/

10,000 California youth under 18

Since 2003, over 10,000 California youth under 18 have been tried as adults; nearly 7,200 of them were directly filed in adult court with no oversight by a judge.

Charging youth as adults has serious, lifelong consequences for the youth involved."

Ballot Measure Would Reform Juvenile Justice

Ballot Measure Would Reform Juvenile Justice
Lets Judges, Not Prosecutors, Decide on Trying Youth as Adults


California Governor Jerry Brown announced a smart and humane ballot measure on January 27, 2016, that would dramatically reform both juvenile and criminal justice laws in the state, Human Rights Watch said today. If enough signatures are gathered, the measure would appear on the November ballot.


The proposed changes to California's juvenile law would give judges sole power to grant or deny prosecutors' requests to remove a youth from juvenile court to be tried as an adult in the criminal system. Current law allows prosecutors to directly charge youth as young as 14 in adult court, where they face the prospect of adult penalties, including lengthy prison terms.


"Governor Brown's proposed reform would affect the single most important decision the state makes about a child," said Elizabeth Calvin, senior children's rights advocate at Human Rights Watch. "A decision to try a youth as an adult is a decision to give up on that young person and deny them the education, treatment, and services the juvenile system provides to help turn their lives around."


California is one of just 15 states in the United States that allow a prosecutor instead of a judge to make the decision to file cases in adult court. Since 2003, over 10,000 California youth under 18 have been tried as adults; nearly 7,200 of them were directly filed in adult court with no oversight by a judge.

Charging youth as adults has serious, lifelong consequences for the youth involved; and multiple studies have shown that youth who are prosecuted in the adult system commit new offenses more quickly and go on to commit more serious crimes than those who are kept in the juvenile justice system for the same offenses.

"Youth who commit crimes should be held accountable, but the right place to do that is the juvenile justice system," Calvin said.

The US Supreme Court, in a series of five recent cases, has underscored that children are developmentally less mature than adults. Their punishment should take into account their diminished culpability and their capacity to change. Judgments about punishment are best made by the juvenile system, which takes these factors into account.

Under current California law, prosecutors typically have to make the decision whether to file in adult court within 48 hours of the crime. They do so without crucial information about the young person's life and ability to grow and change.

The ballot measure would also authorize adult parole consideration for nonviolent inmates who complete the full sentence for their primary offense and allow prisoners to earn credits for good behavior, education, and rehabilitative achievement.

"The proposed changes recognize everyone's dignity and potential," Calvin said. "If this proposal is passed, California would be taking an important step toward reducing its reliance on extremely long prison sentences."

Join us for the CARES Family & Friends Call

Join us for the CARES Family & Friends Call
Tuesday, August 4th at 8:00 pm
when we welcome
Jose G.


CARES is honored to present Jose G. who paroled under SB 260 two months ago after many years in prison. When he reflects on his life, he remembers a family that was loving at times, but his childhood was marked by abuse and abandonment. He was 12 when his father died from an overdose, and soon after Jose was also separated from his mother. Looking back, he sees that he ran from the pain in his young life and turned to gangs. At seventeen he committed a murder, was tried as an adult, and sentenced to life in prison. For a number of years he continued as a gang member, digging deeper into a dark hole.

Join us to hear his remarkable story of transformation and how he moved from that dark place to become a man who left the gang lifestyle far behind, earned an A.A. degree in sociology and behavioral science, and won release. He is now working as an intern at the Anti-Recidivism Coalition and seeks to help others. He hopes to enroll in college and says "ultimately I just want to live and love. I want to be the complete opposite of what I was for so long."

Jose will talk with CARES about the key factors he found helpful in turning his life around; describe his experience with SB 260 and the board; and answer questions from family and friends of youth sentenced to adults.

Please join us! Meet this special person,
welcome him home, and learn from him.

JUST CALL TO JOIN!
Call: (805) 399-1000 Code: 817682#

(Prosecuted in Adult Criminal Court for offenses as Benign as Arriving Late For Class.)

NJJN Member Files Federal Complaint on Behalf of Youth in Dallas School System Three legal advocacy organizations, including NJJN member Texas Appleseed and NJJN partner, the National Center for Youth Law, have filed a civil rights complaint with the Department of Justice on behalf of students in the Dallas County school system. According to Pat Arthur, a youth justice strategist working with Texas Appleseed, students as young as 12 are being prosecuted in adult criminal court for offenses as benign as arriving late for class. And while the offenses may be minor, the consequences, says Arthur, are often huge. Youth in these cases suffer all the consequences of a criminal conviction, including being disadvantaged or barred from employment or getting loans, or joining the military. They've been handcuffed in classrooms and brought to truancy court. It's truly a travesty. These cases, says Arthur, frequently and disproportionately target poor students, students of color, and students with disabilities. It's truly a barbaric system of punishing kids for doing what we all did as kids skipping school or being late, Arthur said. And it's totally ineffective. It's contrary to all the best practices that we know about how to address truancy. I've never seen anything so outrageously wrongheaded. The complaint requests that the truancy system be revised to incorporate a flexible, transparent tardiness policy, greater accommodations for students with disabilities, and school-wide behavioral interventions and supports. http://www.njjn.org/article/texas-member-files-federal-complaint-on-behalf-of-youth-in-dallas- schools? National Juvenile Justice Network | 1319 F St. NW | Suite 402 | Washington | DC | 20004

Massachusetts House Approves Bill to "Raise the Age"

Massachusetts House Approves Bill to "Raise the Age" For First Time since 19th Century In Massachusetts, one could say that raising the age of the juvenile court's jurisdiction has been a long time coming. "We haven't changed the age of jurisdiction for hundreds of years," said Naoka Casey, executive director of Citizens for Juvenile Justice (CfJJ), an NJJN member. That may change soon, however, in light of the Massachusetts House of Representatives' unanimous passage of a bill that would expand juvenile jurisdiction (H. 1432) by moving 17-year-old youth from criminal court jurisdiction to juvenile court. CfJJ has been a driving force behind the bill since the beginning. The organization conducted its own research and outreach campaign, and partnered with system stakeholders most notably the local sheriff's association to gain widespread, bipartisan support for its efforts. "It's not done until it's done," Carey said. "We're close, and I'm going to keep knocking on wood." » Read the full story here.

Missouri Legislature Unanimously Expands Youth Services for Some Teens Tried as Adults

Missouri Legislature Unanimously Expands Youth Services for Some Teens Tried as Adults In the last weeks of May, the Missouri legislature voted unanimously in favor of S.B. 36, making changes in the state's program for youth subject to the dual jurisdiction of adult and juvenile courts. The program allows some youth who have been convicted or pled guilty in adult court to remain in the custody of Missouri's Department of Youth Services (DYS). That means they can be housed in a youth-oriented facility and receive a range of education and counseling services unavailable to adult offenders. The bill, also called "Jonathan's Law," was named for Jonathan McClard, a 17-year-old who was sentenced to 30 years in an adult facility. Tragically, McClard lost hope and took his own life. His mother, Tracy McClard, campaigned hard to get the bill passed. The bill awaits the governor's signature. » Read the full story here.

The Remarkable Transformation of CT’s Juvenile Justice System

We thought of the children Posted: 28 Feb 2013 04:30 AM PST For years I’ve written about the sorry state of the juvenile justice system and the inattention we pay to the lives of the children who get caught up in it, sometimes through no fault of their own. So it heartens me (with some pretty important reservations) to see this report [PDF] from the Justice Policy Institute about the remarkable transformation of CT’s juvenile justice system from one of complete failure to that of a role model for the rest of the country in about 10 short years. From their executive summary [PDF]: In 2007, Connecticut made national headlines when it passed a law ending its status as one of just three states that automatically tried and punished all 16 and 17 year-olds as adults. Yet this historic “Raise the Age” legislation is just one of many reforms enacted by Connecticut’s juvenile justice system in recent years. Propelled by a determined coalition of advocates and public sector innovators, Connecticut has forged a new consensus for progressive change in juvenile justice, and it has transformed a previously wasteful, punitive, ineffective, and often abusive juvenile justice system into a national model – at no additional cost to taxpayers. Perhaps more than any other state, Connecticut has absorbed the growing body of knowledge about youth development and delinquency, adopted its lessons, and used the information to fundamentally re-invent its approach to juvenile justice. As a result, Connecticut’s system today is far and away more successful, more humane, and more cost-effective than it was 10 or 20 years ago. And the evidence is staggering: residential commitments for juveniles are down 70% despite the influx of 16 and 176 year olds into the system; the number of juveniles locked up for “status offenses” (missing school, etc.) has become negligible; the number of youth tried and convicted as adults has also drastically declined: For decades, Connecticut was one of only three states that prosecuted and punished all 16- and 17-year-olds as adults. In 2007, the state enacted historic legislation to raise the age of juvenile jurisdiction from 16 to 18, effective January 1, 2010 for 16 year olds and July 1, 2012 for 17 year olds. Even before 17 year-olds became eligible for juvenile court on July 1, 2012, the new law had enabled 8,325 16 year-olds to avoid prosecution and punishment in the adult criminal justice system. Extending juvenile jurisdiction to 16 year-olds has increased juvenile caseloads far less than expected (22 percent actual versus 40 percent projected); as a result the state spent nearly $12 million less in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 than it had budgeted. Meanwhile, 16 year-olds served by the juvenile system have had higher success rates in alternative programs and lower rearrest rates than youth 15 and younger, disproving concerns that they should be in the adult system. That’s great and all and everyone involved with this staggering reform must be commended. But. But as I’ve written before, there are 14 and 15 and 16 and 17 year olds who are still treated as adults. And still subjected to the horrors of the adult criminal system and adult prisons: Department of Correction data show that youth incarcerated in adult correctional facilities suffer alarming recidivism: 85 percent are re-arrested within two years of release, 62 percent are convicted of new crimes, and 70 percent return to prison on a new charge or parole violation. Pursuant to C.G.S. 46b-127, any child 14 and older, who is accused of a Class B or A felony is automatically transferred to adult court and treated like an adult. There is no discretion; the legislature, in their “hard on crime” binges in the 90s, took that power away from the prosecutor and the judge. At the same time, they legislature removed the defendant’s seat at the table. The defense can no longer put on a hearing or ask that the case remain in juvenile court. Even when the case is in adult court, no one except the prosecutor has the authority to decide to send it back. There’s no oversight and, unlike New Jersey [PDF], our legislature and courts haven’t decided that the decision to treat 14 year olds like adults is important enough to warrant that someone, somewhere state their reasons for doing so on the record. There is absolutely no accountability and the only thing that matters is checking off a box on a list. So, you say, that’s fine. Even a 14 year old should be held accountable for a serious crime. No doubt. But do you know the punishments Class A and B felonies expose a teenager to? Class B felonies have a 20 year maximum and Class A 25 years, both longer than the life that the teenager would have lived up to that point. Making matters worse is the mandatory-minimums. There is a lengthy list of crimes for which 14 year old children have to be tried as adults which carry mandatory minimum sentences of 5 or 10 years. And that means no matter how much anyone thinks it’s wrong, the child must get that time in jail. Minimum. According to the data in this report, in 2010, approximately 170 children were automatically transferred to adult court and kept there and treated as adults. How many of them are now serving long, mandatory prison sentences in adult court? Whose 14 year old is going through absolute hell? When the Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, it made no distinction between 14, 15, 16 and 17 year olds. Because the Court recognized that they were, after all, children. Why do we insist differently? Our decisions rested not only on common sense — on what “any parent knows” — but on science and social science as well. Id., at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183. In Roper, we cited studies showing that “`[o]nly a relatively small proportion of adolescents’” who engage in illegal activity “`develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior.’” Id., at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (quoting Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014 (2003)). And in Graham, we noted that “developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds” — for example, in “parts of the brain involved in behavior control.” 560 U.S., at ___, 130 S.Ct., at 2026.[5] We reasoned that those findings — 2465*2465 of transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences — both lessened a child’s “moral culpability” and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological development occurs, his “`deficiencies will be reformed.’” Id., at ___, 130 S.Ct., at 2027 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S., at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183). Roper and Graham emphasized that the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes. Children are different. Let’s continue to treat them that apublicdefender.com /Feb.28/2013

Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court:Study The Effects Of

Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court: Effects of a Broad Policy in One Court Edward P. Mulvey and Carol A. Schubert Highlights This bulletin presents findings from the Pathways to Desistance study about the effects of transfer from juvenile court to adult court on a sample of serious adolescent offenders in Maricopa County, AZ. The authors compare the extant literature with findings from the Pathways study and discuss the possible implications of these findings for future changes in transfer statutes. Following are some key points: • Adolescents in the adult system may be at risk for disruptions in their personal development, identity formation, relationships, learning, growth in skills and competencies, and positive movement into adult status. • Most of the youth in the study who were sent to adult facilities returned to the community within a few years, varying widely in their levels of adjustment. Youth were more likely to successfully adjust when they were not influenced by antisocial peers. • Prior work indicates that transferred youth are more likely to commit criminal acts than adolescents kept in the juvenile justice system. • Findings from the Pathways study indicate that transfer may have a differential effect (either reducing or increasing offending), depending on the juvenile’s presenting offense and prior offense history. Transfer to adult court indicates that the demand for proportional punishment has trumped the goal of individualized rehabilitation found in the juvenile justice system (Zimring, 2005). Since the court’s inception, juvenile justice policymakers and professionals have wrestled with the decision about when to transfer an adolescent to adult court (Tanenhaus, 2004). Currently, individual states have combinations of statutorily defined mechanisms for determining when the movement of a juvenile case to adult court is required or appropriate, including procedures such as judicial transfer, certification, automatic waiver, or direct file (Griffin, 2003; Fagan and Zimring, 2000). In general, state statutes define a set of crimes for adolescent offenders of a certain age that warrant processing in the adult system (i.e., a statutory exclusion from the presumed jurisdiction of the juvenile court). Most states also have a mechanism (e.g., decertification, reverse waiver) for returning the case to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court when deemed appropriate. (See Sickmund, 1994; Griffin, 2006; and Redding, 2008, for an elaboration of these statutory provisions.) During the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, a sharp rise in violent crime produced intense interest in the causes of juvenile crime and the effectiveness of the juvenile justice system. Juvenile arrests for violent offenses jumped dramatically during this time period, increasing 64 percent nationally between 1980 and 1994 (Butts and Travis, 2002). In addition, some highly publicized cases of juveniles committing repeated, serious violent offenses contributed to public perception that the juvenile justice system was inadequate to intervene effectively with adolescents who were a legitimate threat to public safety (Butterfield, 1995). These forces even prompted radical, and ultimately unfounded, rhetoric about a coming wave of adolescent “superpredators” unlike any previous juvenile offenders in their heartlessness and lack of response to interventions (DiIulio, 1995). It is generally believed that these statutory reforms produced an increase in the rate of transfer, at least in a large number of locales (Fagan, 2008; Penney and Moretti, 2005). However, it is difficult to gauge the specific effects of these changes because of the lack of comprehensive and consistent data about transferred adolescent offenders. No systematic national count of the number of youth who are transferred or waived to criminal court exists, nor are there consistent data on the characteristics of these adolescents across locales. The National Center for Juvenile Justice tracks judicial transfers made at the discretion of juvenile court judges. These figures show a clear decline in adolescent transfers using this mechanism, presumably because other statutory mechanisms have increased their rate of transfer (Adams and Addie, 2010). However, no accurate tallies of the total number of transfers across all possible mechanisms exists. The sources for estimating the number of adolescents in adult prisons or jails on any given day or during any given period of time are also inconsistent (Woolard et al., 2005). According to available data, the number and proportion of adolescents in adult prisons appear to have peaked in the mid-1990s (about 5,000 prisoners, or 2.3 percent of the total prison population, according to Hartney, 2006) and to have fallen since then to less than 3,000, or 1.2 percent, in 2004 (Hartney, 2006; see Austin, Johnson, and Gregoriou, 2000, for somewhat larger estimates for the mid-1990s). Estimates of the number of adolescents in adult jails on any given day are considerably greater, ranging from about 7,000 (Hartney, 2006) to 19,000 (Austin, Johnson, and Gregoriou, 2000)—about 1 in 10 youth incarcerated in the United States are admitted to an adult prison or jail (Eggleston, 2007). In addition, little is actually known about outcomes for adolescent offenders who are transferred to the adult system. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) funded a recent study to compile available information about the number of adolescents who were transferred across a range of locales and the subsequent sanctions these individuals received. Study results are anticipated in 2012 and are expected to be “the best national estimates ever, Despite the lack of definitive numeric estimates, it is reasonable to assume that the changes in transfer statutes have led to an increase in the heterogeneity of the youth sent to adult court in many locales (Schubert et al., 2010). That is, expansions of the transfer statutes and an increased reliance on the presenting offense have made it easier for the adult court to process a broader range of adolescents; these adolescents likely differ widely in their prior legal involvement, developmental status (because there is now a wider age span for youth who are eligible for transfer), and specific risk factors related to offending. In general, researchers believe that the group of adolescents now transferred to adult court includes “a broad range of offenders who are neither particularly serious nor particularly chronic” (Bishop and Frazier, 2000, p. 265). Longer Sentences One potentially harmful outcome for transferred adolescent offenders is a longer or harsher sentence than they might have experienced if they had remained in the juvenile justice system. Both sides of the political spectrum seem to believe that this is the case. Those in favor of “get tough” policies promote long sentences for youth and see transfer to the adult system as a method to achieve this end. Meanwhile, those opposing adult sentences for juveniles imply that transfer to adult court produces long confinement in an adult facility. Disruptions in Development In addition to the immediate physical and psychological dangers resulting from incarceration, adolescents transferred to the adult system can also experience harmful disruptions in their development during late adolescence and early adulthood. Adolescent offenders can be assumed to be particularly diverse, and potentially delayed, in many aspects of social development (Monahan et al., 2009). Also, considerable evidence exists that prison and jail environments present challenges to one’s sense of self and identity that even hardened criminals find disorienting, upsetting, and traumatic. Particularly vulnerable adolescents are thus taking the next steps of their developmental journey in an environment that does not promote physical or emotional health and that may harm their progress as well. Although an adolescent and an adult might receive what appears to be an equivalent sentence for a similar crime (e.g., 3 years for a felony assault), adolescents are paying for their crimes at a different point in their life journey; the impact of this experience may be more dramatic as a result. Identity formation is one of the most salient processes of adolescent development that incarceration might affect. To fashion a sense of self (i.e., to figure out who one is in relation to family and others, as well as what one’s future might hold), most adolescents follow a pattern of individuating from parents, orienting toward peers, and integrating components of attitudes and behavior into an autonomous self-identity (Collins and Steinberg, 2006) Adolescents in the adult system also often lose critical opportunities for learning in late adolescence. By definition, adolescence marks the transition period between childhood and adulthood during which an individual progresses toward adult levels of responsibility and adult roles. Adolescents gradually take greater control over an expanding range of life decisions; they also make mistakes, pick up pointers, and learn lessons along the way. According to Zimring (2005), during this period adolescents are operating with a “learner’s permit” for developing maturity; they are generally under the watchful eye of caring individuals and are afforded more tolerance from society for making bad choices. Learning about job-related expectations, gaining résumé-building skills, discovering qualities in a potential life partner, learning how to spend unstructured time, and learning to manage a household are not easily acquired behavioral repertoires—they require some trial and error. The regimented and highly structured schedules and restrictions in jail and prison environments, however, at best reduce opportunities to develop lasting romantic relationships, identify career interests, or develop work skills. Even the most progressive of these environments (e.g., specialized young adult offender programs) cannot provide experiences as broad as those provided to unconfined youth.

Cristian Fernandez

Benjamin Sebastian

http://jacksonville.com/news/​crime/2012-07-03/story/​judge-rule-aug-7-whether-suppre​ss-cristian-fernandez-interrog​ations




Judge to rule by Aug. 7 whether to suppress Cristian Fernandez interrogations
jacksonville.com
Court watchers will learn this morning whether Cristian Fernandez's defense team puts on a final witness or goes right to closing arguments in the fourth day of his suppression hearing.

11-year-old serving a 25 year prison term for a crime she did not commit.

Lacresha Murray is an 11-year-old serving a 25 year prison term for a crime she did not commit.

She was charged in the death of Jayla Belton with capital murder, found guilty of negligent homicide and injury to a child, and sentenced to 25 years--with no evidence, witnesses, opportunity, motive, nor history of aggression.

Months before her trial, against juvenile law and State Bar rules, D.A. Ronnie Earle announced her identity and pronounced her guilty in a televised news conference.The media, without any investigation, headlined her as guilty as charged for two months, obliterating any possibility of a fair trial.

Hidden from her family for four days, without a break, Lacresha was lied to, threatened, tricked and brainwashed during a three-hour interrogation by the Austin Police Department (APD). Not only did they deny her an attorney or parent present during this deceptively and illegally arranged interrogation, they threateningly coerced a false statement out of her, and failed to

read her all of her rights
ensure she understood them,
ascertain whether Lacresha could read the statement they typed up, which she could not.
By all accounts, this interrogation was immoral, illegal and inadmissible as evidence, and yet it was used as the only evidence against her. With no evidence, witnesses, motive, opportunity or history of aggressive behavior, Lacresha was found guilty -- twice.


In the first trial, she was denied a defense.

In the second trial, she was provided a rigged defense. During the second trial, the prosecution based it's case on the assertion there was a match between the shoes they alleged Lacresha was wearing and the injuries on Jayla Belton's body; however, these shoes were not Lacresha's. They were boy's tennis shoes, 3 sizes too large. Her family did not recognize them, and everyone who saw her that day, including hospital personnel and police, saw her barefoot.

The State's two "experts" who testified there was indeed a match, admitted on the stand they had not actually measured or tested the shoes in comparison to Jayla Belton's injuries. In fact, one of the "experts" did not see the shoes until minutes before he testified there was a match. The only scientific, forensic testing of the shoes was done by the police department's crime lab, which sent a report to prosecutors stating there was not a match. The only qualified expert evidence the prosecution had completely undermined their case. The jury had the right to see this report, but the prosecutors and judge suppressed it.

The judge, D.A., APD, Travis County Medical Examiner and the prosecutors in this matter failed to obey Texas law, designed to protect innocent children, and colluded with each other to imprison this innocent child for purely political reasons. By framing and imprisoning this innocent child, D.A. Ronnie Earle got national attention and right-before-election proof he was indeed tough on crime. Judge Dietz, Earle's former campaign manager and friend, got to provide a self-serving favor for Earle. The police got to close another case without much effort or cost. The prosecutors got both an easy win for their resumes and a chance to exercise the eagerly-awaited Determinate Sentencing Act, enabling them to imprison juveniles convicted of violent crimes for lengthy sentences.

Lacresha Murray got 25 years.


*Obviously, the goals of our justice system are not always met, but did you know that the legal safeguards we so highly value and trust are increasingly being violated in juvenile cases? For those with children, the travesty of the case against Lacresha Murray literally means that the police can arrest and accuse your children of a horrendous crime, secret them away from you, deliberately and illegally deny them an attorney and/or parent during interrogation, subject them to lies, trickery, threats and bullying during an interrogation, deny them full notification of the charge against them and its consequences, completely slander their reputation, as well as that of the entire family, and put them away for 25 to 40 years, or more -- without evidence.

By any other name, this is child abuse by our justice system. Although this is not supposed to happen in America, it did and it could happen to your child.

This was in 1999
------------------
After 3 long years of confinement for a crime she did not commit.
On August 13, 2001 all charges were dismissed.

Dear Friends and Supporters,


The charges against La Cresha Murray, now 17, have been dismissed with prejudice, which means for all time. They cannot reprosecute. They will also not prosecute the real perpetrators despite the fact that there is and was evidence available in 1996 establishing the time of Jayla Belton's injuries and clearing the Murrays; but lawyers never admit wrong, especially district attorneys and prosecutors and corrupt judges.

http://www.peopleoftheheart.org/home.htm

Discriminatory Juvenile Justice Practices in Tennessee and Nebraska

New Reports Reveal Discriminatory Juvenile Justice Practices in Tennessee and Nebraska


In a recently released report, the U.S. Department of Justice documented that young black children in the juvenile justice system in Memphis, Tennessee, were more likely than white children to be detained and even tried as adults -- for the same crimes.


Meanwhile, researchers at the University of Nebraska at Omaha's Juvenile Justice Institute recently released results of a study concluding that minority children in Nebraska receive disproportionately harsh treatment in the juvenile justice system.

According to National juvenile Justice Network
-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jordan Brown should be released from custody until his trial in juvenile court.

NEW CASTLE, Pennsylvania - A hearing will be held in Lawrence County Common Pleas Court on Tuesday at 9:00 a.m. to determine if teenage murder suspect Jordan Brown should be released from custody until his trial in juvenile court.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania issued a decision on Friday that the lower court erred in not holding a detention hearing sooner for Brown.

Brown was just 11-years-old when he was arrested and charged with shooting and killing his father's fiancé, Kenzie Marie Houk, and her unborn child. Houk was shot in the back of the head as she slept in her Wampum home.

Now, three years after the crime, at age 14, Brown could be released in to the custody of his father as he awaits his trial in juvenile court.

http://www.wfmj.com/story/17316276/teenage-murder-suspect-jordan-brown-could-be-temporarily-released-from-custody

Jeff, prosecuted as an adult at age 17 and currently incarcerated in Colorado, writes

Jeff, prosecuted as an adult at age 17 and currently incarcerated in Colorado, writes:

“I was 17 years old when I was charged as an adult…that was in 1994 and here I sit today…I feel like the system has forgotten about me. Yet, I still believe in the system and hope that we can change and fix its problems - the biggest of which is sentencing children as adults. [Children] can’t join the military, vote, drink alcohol, smoke cigarettes, or live on their own…because they are not responsible enough. [However], when it comes to dealing with the system, there is an exception for some reason…We have a juvenile system for a reason, why do we pick and choose who we use it for?”

Nine thousand times a year, U.S. judges move juvenile suspects into criminal court

Nine thousand times a year, U.S. judges move juvenile suspects into criminal court, opening the door to a stay in adult jail.
While judges say these transfers are meant for youths suspected of the most dangerous offenses, only two out of five transferred youths stands accused of a violent crime against another person, the Scripps Howard News Service found in analyzing data from almost a quarter-million cases. Most youths moved to adult court are charged with crimes involving drugs, weapons or property.

A case transfer flags a suspect 17 or younger as an adult. Forty-seven states allow these "certified" juveniles to be held in adult jail, the U.S. Justice Department says; 14 of them sometimes require it.

Most transferred juveniles face charges for crimes other than murder, rape, robbery or assault, National Center for Juvenile Justice data show. The Pittsburgh-based nonprofit publishes records covering 228,771 cases moved from youth court to the adult criminal justice system from 1985 to 2008.

Transfers to the adult system can negatively affect young suspects, reducing their access to social services, lengthening the time needed to resolve a case and increasing the chances that the youths will reoffend, some researchers and youth advocates say.

Judges transfer too many juveniles, said Kevin Burke, president of the American Judges Association.

"There are a fair number of not-very-serious offenders who end up getting certified. I don't quite understand that, to be honest with you," Burke said, responding to the Scripps findings. The Minneapolis-area district court judge has served 27 years on the bench.

Even a very young age doesn't exempt defendants from transfer. The database shows some 1,528 suspects 12 or younger were transferred, including 623 charged with violent crimes. More — 651 — faced charges of property crimes.

Christy was convicted in 2002 }On Coerced Confession

http://www.blogtalkradio.com/thenancylockhartshow/2012/02/16/justice-for-california-prisoner-christy-clinton-phillips



Christy Phillips CDC# W-94100 is unjustly convicted and currrently housed at Central California Women Facility. Christy was convicted in 2002 of an elderly woman's murder that occurred in 2000,based on a coerced confession, and despite the lack of physical or forensic evidence and expert testimony of Christy"s multiple mental disabiblities, her age and the outrageous police misconduct against Christy during her confinement in the Rialto Police station and interrogation. Barely 15 years old Christy was taken by Rialto Police, held overnight against her will denied her constitutional right to remain silent and to have a parent present during her interrogation. The Rialto Police officers used intimidation and isolation as part of there tactic to manipulate and pressure Christy into making a confession to a crime she originally reported. Due to Christy's youth, mental disabilities the lack of experience with the criminal justice system, Christy was an easy victim of police manipulation. Christy's trial judge Gus Skorpos admitted Rialto Police Department violated Christy's rights under Welfare and Institution Codes 637(a).
http://www.christyclintonphillips.blogspot.com

The Age Of The Child* Interrogating Juveniles After Roper v. Simmons

WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385 (2008)

The Age Of The Child* Interrogating Juveniles
After Roper v. Simmons
Tamar R. Birckhead∗


The differences in the psychological and brain development of adolescents
versus adults go a long way to explaining how, in the context of police
interrogation, these common characteristics of adolescence can translate into
attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs that compromise a juvenile’s ability to resist
suggestive questioning techniques.119 For instance, because children and
adolescents have a different sense of time than adults—they live in the present
without much consideration for the long-term consequences of their actions—
studies have shown that it is not uncommon for juvenile suspects to waive their
detailed the 1998 murder of twelve-year-old Stephanie Crowe in her bedroom in Escondido,
California. Her fourteen-year-old brother, Michael, was interrogated by police after he told
them that he had walked by Stephanie’s room that morning but did not see her body. Mark
Sauer & John Wilkins, Haunting Questions: The Stephanie Crowe Murder Case,
SIGNONSANDIEGO.COM, May 1999, at pt. 1 http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/reports/
crowe/crowe1.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Although Michael initially denied any involvement in the crime, after many hours of
interrogation in which the police falsely claimed there was incriminating evidence against him
and promised that Michael would receive "help" instead of jail, he falsely confessed. Id. at pt. 2.
Two of Michael’s teenage friends were also interrogated and falsely confessed to participating
in the crime. Id. at pt. 4. During pretrial motion hearings, Michael’s confession was suppressed
after the judge found that the interrogation techniques had been coercive. Id. at pt. 6. Months
later, Stephanie’s blood was found on the sweatshirt of Richard Tuite, a mentally ill, homeless
man who had been seen in the area on the day of the crime. Id. These developments led to the
eventual dismissal of murder charges against Michael and his friends. Id.
118. See, e.g., Bill Moushey, False Confessions: Coercion Often Leads to False
Confessions, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 31, 2006, http://www.post-gazette.
com/pg/06243/717790-84.stm (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) (citing that 42% of wrongful
convictions of juveniles involved false confessions and that police interrogation techniques can
be coercive but not explaining how or why) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Henry Weinstein, Panel Seeks to Curb False Confessions, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 2006, at 3
(characterizing juveniles as being among those most vulnerable to making false confessions but
not discussing why); John Wilkens, Untrue Confessions, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 15,
2004, at E1 (stating only in passing that police use coercive tactics during interrogations and
that juveniles are particularly vulnerable to them).
119. It is important, however, to acknowledge that there is a distinction between the role
that brain development plays when determining an adolescent’s culpability and the weight to be
given to the suggestibility or impulsivity of that adolescent during interrogation. There is not, at
this time, scientific evidence to support the claim that the ways in which adolescent brain
development make the death penalty inappropriate also produce systemic unreliability in terms
of adolescents’ responses to interrogation. In other words, evidence that an adolescent’s brain
may be less culpable than an adult’s is not necessarily evidence that an adolescent brain is more
suggestible than an adult’s. It is hoped that such inquiries will be pursued in the near future by
those in the fields of neuroscience and developmental psychology.


THE AGE OF THE CHILD 417
right to an attorney and to falsely confess in order to be released from custody
and allowed to go home.120 Similarly, because juveniles are particularly
susceptible to pressure from authority figures, research has found that they are
more compliant and open to suggestion, repetition, and other social influence
tactics than adults, meaning that a teenage suspect is more likely than an adult
to agree to a false or inaccurate version of an event when interrogated by a
police officer.121
A related problem with the traditional investigative techniques used during
police questioning is that juveniles, as a result of their youth and because of
their very nature, often exhibit behaviors that investigators are trained to
associate with deception.122 For instance, studies have found that although
adolescents have difficulty understanding legal terminology, they rarely ask
questions or request clarification and instead pause, hesitate, or equivocate
before answering.123 It has also been shown that teenagers, as a result of lack of
confidence and general anxiety during questioning, avoid making eye contact,
qualify their statements, respond in monosyllables, and provide nonlinear
narratives that are difficult to follow.124 As discussed previously, all such
characteristics should be considered as indicators of deception according to the
Reid Technique, which offers very little in the way of precautions or guidelines
for investigators who must evaluate the behaviors of adolescents.125 Therefore,
120. See Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17
Cases, 15 CRIM. JUST. 26, 28–29 (2000) (discussing a thirteen-year-old who falsely confessed
because he was "desperate to go home" and "believed he could take back his false confession
later"); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 26, at 52 (describing a 1981 study which found that
over 90% of juveniles who are questioned waive their Miranda rights, motivated primarily by
the potential for release from detention).
121. Id. (citing studies from 1995, 1999, and 2003 that found that juveniles are particularly
susceptible when interrogated by police and others in positions of authority).
122. Related to this phenomenon is the law’s expectation that children and adolescents
who have committed serious crimes will demonstrate appropriate levels of remorse. See Martha
Grace Duncan, "So Young and So Untender": Remorseless Children and the Expectations of
the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1473 (2002) (drawing on psychology, sociology, and
literature to challenge the law’s view of remorse as an emotional state that "decent" people—
regardless of age—demonstrate after committing a heinous offense, and explaining that for
developmental reasons, adolescents "may show less grief than the system demands").
123. See, e.g., Marty Beyer, What’s Behind Behavior Matters: The Effects of Disabilities,
Trauma and Immaturity on Juvenile Intent and Ability to Assist Counsel, 58 GUILD PRAC. 112,
112 (2001) (discussing that 17%–53% of juveniles charged with criminal offenses have learning
disabilities and that this often results in difficulties processing information).
124. Id.
125. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (listing behaviors that are considered signs
and signals of deception according to proponents of Reid). The 2004 edition of the text on the
Reid Technique has a short chapter that lists factors that may lead to the misinterpretation of
behaviors during the pre-interrogation interview, including two paragraphs that mention that
418 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385 (2008)
it stands to reason that because police officers do not consciously recognize,
and do not control for, the fact that adolescents—by simple virtue of their
adolescence—often talk and behave in ways that are otherwise consistent with
deception, juveniles are more likely to be deceptive in the pre-interrogation
interview than adults.126
There are several procedural aspects of traditional police interrogation that
also contribute to the particular vulnerability of juveniles. Much has been
written by both legal scholars and social scientists regarding the difficulties that
young people have understanding the language and meaning of Miranda rights,
rendering the warnings almost completely ineffectual in serving their stated
purpose—at least for juveniles.127 In addition, empirical studies have shown
caution must be used when evaluating behaviors of children less than nine-years-old. INBAU,
REID, BUCKLEY & JAYNE, supra note 93, at 155–71. The only mention within the chapter of
juvenile subjects older than nine is a single paragraph that includes the pejorative statement:
"Ordinarily it seems to matter rather little to these subjects whether what they say is truthful or
untruthful; they tend to envision themselves as socially unaccountable for their conduct. As a
consequence, their behavior symptoms tend to be unreliable." Id. at 168.
126. Owen-Kostelnik, Repucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 293. In recent years there have
been a number of well-publicized cases in which police investigators have wrongly found
juveniles to be deceptive during the initial stages of an investigation, leading to coercive and/or
suggestive interrogations that result in false confessions. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Beth A.
Colgan, Tales from the Juvenile Confession Front: A Guide to How Standard Police
Interrogation Tactics Can Produce Coerced and False Confessions from Juvenile Suspects, in
INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT, supra note 114, at 127, 130–51 (discussing
several recent cases in which the police, driven by interviewer bias, conducted investigations
that led them wrongly to suspect that the children they interrogated were involved in the
crimes); see also supra note 117 (discussing the specifics of several recent cases in which
children wrongly confessed as a result of coercive interrogation techniques).
127. A 1981 study of juveniles’ comprehension of Miranda rights concluded that juvenile
detainees aged fourteen and younger were significantly less likely to comprehend their
interrogation rights than older teens and adults. These results were complemented by a study
that found that intelligence strongly correlates with the understanding of one’s legal rights, a
significant finding given that many juvenile offenders have been found to be of low intellect.
See, e.g., THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL
COMPETENCE 39–93, 109–60 (1981) (describing previous research assessing juveniles’ ability to
understand and waive Miranda rights and reporting the results of his own study on this subject);
Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and
Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 333–63 (2003) (finding
that adolescents performed more poorly than adults on a test used to measure competence to
stand trial); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1134–66 (1980) (describing the methodology and results of
empirical studies conducted to assess the capacity of juveniles and adults to knowingly waive
their Miranda rights); see also Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical
Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 233 (2006) (finding that
juveniles aged fifteen and younger showed the "clearest and greatest disability" in exercising
their Miranda rights and their adjudicative competence and that while juveniles aged sixteen
and older appeared to function comparably with adults, "many still exhibited significant deficits
THE AGE OF THE CHILD 419
that adolescents are particularly vulnerable to the classic interrogative
techniques of confronting the suspect with false evidence and utilizing other
forms of "trickery."128 There has also been recent research demonstrating that
the presence of an "interested adult"—such as a parent, guardian, or friend—
which is required by some states to protect juveniles during interrogation, has
no impact on the rate at which juveniles waive their rights, as many parents
assume a passive role during questioning or, instead, strongly urge their
children to "do the right thing" and cooperate.129
The majority holding in Roper v. Simmons, therefore, is instructive in
delineating the central reasons why juveniles are particularly vulnerable to
standard police interrogative techniques. Because adolescents are impulsive,
highly suggestible, and susceptible to the influences of authority figures, the
effects of interviewer bias, guilt-presumption, and the Reid Technique can be
especially pernicious. Further compounding the inherently problematic nature
of interrogation, police often mistake the traits and behaviors naturally
which could increase their vulnerability during interrogation"); King, supra note 108, at 458–62
(discussing the difficulties that adolescents have understanding their Miranda rights and their
resultant inability to make a knowing and intelligent decision to waive them); Redlich et al.,
supra note 114, at 112–14 (discussing contemporary empirical studies, including those
conducted by Grisso, that have investigated juveniles’ comprehension of Miranda rights); infra
notes 172–76 and accompanying text (discussing the distinctions drawn between the
comprehension of "younger" versus "older" adolescents and the significance of such for the
arguments advanced in this Article).
128. See Patrick M. McMullen, Comment, Questioning the Questions: The
Impermissibility of Police Deception in Interrogations of Juveniles, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 971, 992
(proposing a per se bar on all police deception in interrogations of juveniles). But see Feld,
supra note 127, at 312–13 (stating that while deceit, trickery, and false evidence play a
"significant role" in eliciting some false confessions and that Miranda does not "significantly
restrain" the interrogation practices police use following waivers, more empirical research is
needed in this area).
129. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 26, at 52 (citing a 2001 study finding that the
presence of an "interested adult" does not lower the waiver rate for juvenile suspects); see also
Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions, Miranda, and the Right to
Counsel, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 1, at 105, 116–18 [hereinafter Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver]
(discussing that the presence of a parent during interrogation may increase, rather than decrease,
the coercive pressure on a juvenile); Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda
Rights: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 36 (2006) [hereinafter
Feld, Juveniles’ Competence] (stating that approximately twelve states have a per se rule
requiring a parent, guardian, or other interested adult at interrogation and before rights are
waived and citing examples of such). As of the end of the 2002 legislative session, eleven states
had adopted an "interested adult test," requiring that juveniles have an opportunity to consult
with a parent or other interested adult before or during an interrogation. National Center for
Juvenile Justice (NCJJ), Frequently Asked Questions, http://ncjj.servehttp.com/NCJJWebsite/
faq/legislation5.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
420 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385 (2008)
exhibited by adolescents for conscious signs of deception, heightening the
potential for interviewer bias and for false statements by juveniles.
The next subpart addresses the disparity that exists between the number
and quality of procedural protections offered to child witnesses and victims
during questioning and the lack of similar safeguards for juvenile suspects.
C. Young Victims and Suspects: Same Posture, Different Treatment
1. Safeguards for Some but Not Others
Extrapolating the holding and bases of Roper v. Simmons to the area of
juvenile interrogation crystallizes the ways in which juvenile suspects are
particularly vulnerable to the implicit biases and standard questioning
techniques of police investigators. The conundrum is that while the criminal
justice system has not, as of yet, acknowledged or directed its attention to what
is known about the suggestibility of juvenile suspects during questioning,
extensive reforms and procedural safeguards have been developed to reduce the
likelihood that unreliable or inaccurate information will be elicited from young
victims and witnesses of crimes.130 Clinicians, for instance, are trained not to
use leading questions, to video or audiotape the interview, and to avoid
intimidating the child by exerting "undue influence."131 Law enforcement
officers often receive specialized training in child development, child
psychology, and the sociology of the family in preparation for interviewing
child victims and witnesses, and they are taught to avoid suggestive or leading
questioning and to limit the total number of interviews conducted with any one
child.132 Judges have also been educated regarding the special issues that may
arise with child witnesses, including the use of alternative procedures designed
130. See Redlich et al., supra note 114, at 122–23 (arguing that while numerous reforms
and accommodations exist for the questioning of child victim/witnesses, there has been very
little done regarding the interrogation of youthful suspects); see also Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver,
supra note 129, at 106 (discussing the "procedural disparity" that occurs given "the two
competing and conflicting images of young people" contained within American law and culture,
which presents them alternately as "innocent, vulnerable, fragile, and dependent children" and
as "vigorous, autonomous, responsible, almost adult-like people from whose criminal behavior
the public needs protection").
131. NANCY W. PERRY & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE CHILD WITNESS: LEGAL ISSUES
AND DILEMMAS 236–46 (1991).
132. Id. at 248–50; see also At This Prosecutor’s Office, A Furry Soft Spot for Kids,
A.B.A. J., July 2007, at 18 (describing a prosecutor’s office in Seattle that utilizes service dogs
to assist child victims and witnesses during the legal process—training the dogs to stand by the
children during the initial forensic interview, sit with them during trial, and even accompany
them to the witness box when they testify).
THE AGE OF THE CHILD 421
to reduce trauma to the child, the appointment of experts to inform the court as
to how children process memories and understand language, and the
importance of instructing the jury about children’s abilities and shortcomings as
witnesses.133
In addition, in each of the fifty states, judges have written opinions and
legislators have drafted statutes delineating the basic requirements for the
competency of child witnesses.134 Some states hold that children below a
specified age—usually ten, twelve, or fourteen—are presumptively incompetent
to testify, unless a trial judge finds otherwise.135 Other states require the child
to indicate that she understands the difference between the truth and a lie and to
agree to tell the truth while testifying.136 In recent years, an increasing number
133. PERRY & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 131, at 250–52.
134. Owen-Kostelnik, Repucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 288; see PERRY &
WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 131, at 41; see also, e.g., In re J.M., 2006 OH Ct. App. 1203, ¶ 26
(reversing a sixteen-year-old juvenile’s delinquency adjudication for rape and remanding to the
trial court to conduct a more complete competency hearing to determine whether the twelveyear-
old complaining witness was competent to testify).
135. PERRY & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 131, at 41; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-
106 (2002) (providing a rebuttable presumption that children under the age of ten may not
testify, except in cases involving abuse); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-202 (2004) (creating a similar
presumption of incompetence for children under ten years of age and providing that the trial
judge may assess the competency of a child under the age of ten individually); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15:469 (repealed 1988) (providing that children under the age of twelve must be
evaluated by the court); MO. REV. STAT. § 491.060 (West 1996 & Supp. 2007) (same, also
providing an exception for victims under the age of ten); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.20
(McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2008) (creating the same rebuttable presumption of incompetence for
people under the age of nine).
136. See PERRY & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 131, at 43–45 (explaining that this
requirement is also characterized as appreciating "the duty to tell the truth" which is a corollary
of the traditional testimonial oath requirement); see also, e.g., Suggs v. State, 879 S.W.2d 428,
431–32 (Ark. 1994) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding child
witnesses competent where two boys, ages five and seven, showed the ability to distinguish
between the truth and a lie and additionally promised to tell the truth); Z.P. v. State, 651 So. 2d
213, 213–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing and remanding the trial court’s decision in a
case where the trial court failed to inquire into whether a child witness knew the difference
between a truth and a lie "in addition to whether the child ha[d] a moral sense of the duty to tell
the truth"); State v. Ransom, 864 P.2d 149, 156–57 (Idaho 1993) (holding that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony of a child victim where she testified that she
could distinguish between the truth and a lie and additionally promised to tell the truth);
Commonwealth v. Monzon, 744 N.E.2d 1131, 1135 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (discussing whether
a child witness has the "understanding sufficient to comprehend the difference between truth
and falsehood, the wickedness of the latter and the obligation and duty to tell the truth, and, in a
general way, belief that failure to perform the obligation will result in punishment" (citations
omitted)); People v. Shavers, 613 N.Y.S.2d 393, 393–94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding that a
child’s testimony at trial was properly admitted where the child "knew the difference between
the truth and a lie and that the word ‘swear’ means that ‘you will always tell the truth’").
422 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385 (2008)
of states have adopted some form of the Federal Rules of Evidence, under
which the judge determines the witness’s competency, while the jury
determines the credibility and weight of that testimony.137 Similarly, we have
seen the development and increasing availability of "taint hearings," in which
defense attorneys can request that an evidentiary hearing be held to determine if
the child’s testimony has been improperly "tainted" by suggestive interviewing
techniques or practices.138 Crawford v. Washington139 provided further
137. See PERRY & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 131, at 45–47 (discussing Rules 601 and 603
of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the difficulties that states have had in meaningfully
interpreting these rules); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-165 (LexisNexis 2005) (providing that
the trial judge determines the competency of potentially incompetent witnesses, including
children); MICH. R. EVID. 601 (stating that everyone is competent to testify as a witness, unless
the trial judge determines otherwise); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 601 (2007) (same); TENN.
R. EVID. 601 (same); TEX. R. EVID. 601 (same). In states where trial judges have such broad
discretion, a finding of competency can only be overruled on appeal if it can be determined that
it was unreasonable for the trial judge to find that a witness was competent. See State v. Hicks,
352 S.E.2d 424, 426 (N.C. 1989) (stating that "[a]bsent a showing that the ruling as to
competency could not have been the result of a reasoned decision, the ruling must stand on
appeal"). Additionally, "[t]he test of competency is the capacity of the proposed witness to
understand and to relate under the obligation of an oath facts" that will enable the jury to decide
a case. State v. Turner, 150 S.E.2d 406, 410 (N.C. 1966). The Turner court, in interpreting the
North Carolina Rules of Evidence, further observed that "[t]here is no age below which one is
incompetent, as a matter of law, to testify." Id.
138. Owen-Kostelnik, Repucci & Meyer, supra note 27, at 288. Taint hearings in child
sexual abuse cases were first adopted in New Jersey, following the highly publicized New Jersey
case of State v. Michaels. See Julie A. Jablonski, Where Has Michaels Taken Us?: Assessing
the Future of Taint Hearings, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 49, 50–57 (1998) (describing
the procedure for pretrial taint hearings in New Jersey following Michaels); see also Clayton
Gillette, Comment, Appointing Special Masters to Evaluate the Suggestiveness of a Child-
Witness Interview: A Simple Solution to a Complex Problem, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 499, 520–37
(2005) (describing the Michaels solution for suggestive interviewing techniques and expanding
on it). But see John E.B. Myers, Taint Hearings for Child Witnesses? A Step in the Wrong
Direction, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 873, 899 (1994) (describing the procedure adopted by the
Michaels court but asserting that pretrial taint hearings compromise the prosecution of
legitimate sexual abuse cases). Although only a couple of states expressly allow for pretrial
taint hearings, several others address the issue of taint in separate pretrial hearings; these states
include New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming. See State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d
1372, 1382 (N.J. 1994) (holding that where a defendant can show that there is sufficient
evidence of unreliability of a child witness’s statements, the state must conduct a pretrial taint
hearing); People v. Michael M., 618 N.Y.S.2d 171, 180 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that in
some cases it is appropriate for the court to order a hearing to assess whether trial testimony has
been tainted); Commonwealth v. Delbridge, 855 A.2d 27, 39–40 (Pa. 2003) (holding that "taint
is a legitimate question for examination in cases involving complaints of sexual abuse made by
young children" and that the proper way to explore potential taint is in a pretrial competency
hearing); English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 146–47 (Wyo. 1999) (holding that taint should be
addressed in a pretrial competency hearing).
139. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004) (finding a Sixth Amendment
violation and holding inadmissible an out-of-court, adverse statement made by petitioner’s wife
THE AGE OF THE CHILD 423
guarantees for the reliability of children’s testimony, holding that out-of-court
statements of witnesses can be admitted only if the speaker is unavailable and
the accused had a prior opportunity for cross examination.140
In comparison, few, if any, protections have been developed to ensure that
the information elicited from juvenile suspects is reliable; in fact, prior to Roper
v. Simmons, the last major decision that protected the rights of juvenile suspects
was In re Gault, decided over forty years ago.141 Gault was preceded by Haley
v. Ohio142 and Gallegos v. Colorado,143 opinions which recognized that young
people, based on their age and relative immaturity, needed explicit protections
under the law, particularly in the context of criminal interrogation.144 Four
where the petitioner had no opportunity to confront the evidence).
140. Id. See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and
Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511 (2005) (discussing how
Crawford v. Washington radically changed Confrontation Clause doctrine and proposing how
the doctrine should develop in response). Crawford and its progeny have rejected any policybased-
child-hearsay exceptions to this firm rule of exclusion, with one state supreme court
recently noting that "[e]ven though there are sound public policy reasons for limiting a child
victim’s exposure to a potentially traumatizing courtroom experience, we nonetheless must be
faithful to the Constitution’s deep concern for the fundamental rights of the accused." Snowden
v. State, 867 A.2d 314, 329 (Md. 2005). See also Daniel E. Monnat & Paige A. Nichols, The
Kid Gloves Are Off: Child Hearsay After Crawford v. Washington, CHAMPION, Jan.–Feb. 2006,
at 18, 18 (discussing Crawford v. Washington from the perspective of the criminal defense
attorney and offering arguments for keeping accusatory child hearsay out of court).
141. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the holding and significance of In
re Gault for the development of the rights of juvenile suspects). Gault emphasized that "the
greatest care must be taken to assure that [a minor’s] admission was voluntary." In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
142. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 598–99 (1948) (plurality opinion) (holding that a
confession obtained from a fifteen-year-old boy without the benefit of counsel and through the
utilization of coercive techniques failed to comport with due process).
143. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962) (plurality opinion) (concluding that
the totality of circumstances surrounding the confession of a fourteen-year-old, including his
age, his prolonged detention, and the failure to provide him with counsel or a friendly adult,
violated his due process rights).
144. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 51–55; Haley, 332 U.S. at 599–601. The paternalistic language
used to describe the vulnerabilities of youth in these two cases is striking. In Haley, in which
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction based on the coerced confession of a
fifteen-year-old African-American boy, Justice Douglas wrote for the plurality:
What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were
involved. And when, as here, a mere child—an easy victim of the law—is before
us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and
difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the more exacting
standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can
overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the period of great
instability which the crisis of adolescence produces . . . . He needs counsel and
support if he is not to become the victim first of fear, then of panic.
Id. at 733 (Powell, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 724–25. Research has shown that juveniles are "more prone than adults" to
confuse their right to an attorney with a right—which they do not have—to a social worker or
other service provider. Redlich et al., supra note 114, at 112.
154. Michael C., 441 U.S. at 730 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall observed that:
A juvenile in these circumstances will likely turn to his parents, or another adult
responsible for his welfare, as the only means for securing legal counsel.
Moreover, a request for such adult assistance is surely inconsistent with a present
desire to speak freely. Requiring a strict verbal formula to invoke the protections of
Miranda would "protect the knowledgeable accused from stationhouse coercion
while abandoning the young person who knows no more than to ask for the . . .
person he trusts."
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Chaney v. Wainwright, 561 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir.
1977) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)); see also Ellen Marrus, Can I Talk Now?: Why Miranda Does
Not Offer Adolescents Adequate Protections, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 515, 518–22 (2006) (discussing
major cases that have impacted the law of juvenile interrogations, including In re Gault,
Gallegos v. Colorado, Haley v. Ohio, and Fare v. Michael C.).
See Brief for Juvenile Law Center, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
25–26, Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (No. 02-1684), 2003 WL 23055034
(describing statutes that require the presence of an interested adult during interrogations of
minors). In states employing the "interested adult" test, most consider either a parent/guardian
or an attorney to be a satisfactory "interested adult," and very few specifically require an
attorney. Id. In Illinois, minors under a certain age must be represented by counsel during the
entirety of a police interrogation; in Texas, written waiver of one’s Miranda rights is required
from both the child and her attorney. Id. at n.15. In most other states with "interested adult"
requirements, representation by counsel can be waived by a parent or guardian, the juvenile may
waive it herself as long as a parent or guardian is present, or the presence of a parent or guardian
may simply replace the "required" presence of counsel. Id.
158. See Feld, supra note 127, at 226 (finding that approximately one dozen states require
the presence of either a parent or guardian or another "interested adult" presence during police
interrogations, in order to ensure a valid waiver of Miranda rights); see also supra note 129 and
accompanying text (noting that a parent’s presence during interrogation of his/her child may, in
fact, increase the pressure on the juvenile to confess).

13 Year Old Boy's Mom Asks That He Not Be Shackled At Trial

Our goal is to reach 100 signatures and we need more support. You can read more and sign the petition here:

http://www.change.org/petitions/remove-shackles-from-cristian-fernandez

Thanks!
Melissa

whether adolescent offenders should be prosecuted in the juvenile or adult system is important

The question of whether adolescent offenders should be prosecuted in the juvenile or adult system is important


Most states’ juvenile justice systems have two main goals: increased public safety and the rehabilitation of
adolescent off enders to prevent future crime. Policymakers and others need balanced information about
the most eff ective ways to meet both goals.
Currently, North Carolina, New York, and Connecticut are the only states that prosecute 16- and 17-year-olds
charged with a crime in adult criminal court. The North Carolina General Assembly is addressing the question of
whether 16- and 17-year-olds charged with a crime should be prosecuted in juvenile court instead.
The question of whether adolescent offenders should be prosecuted in the juvenile or adult system is important
because off enders aged 16-24 account for 37 percent of arrests for violent crimes in the United States and North
Carolina. Policies that impact the frequency and duration of criminal activity among 16- and 17-year-olds have a
major impact on overall crime rates and public safety.
Th is Family Impact Seminar briefing report addresses the line between the juvenile and adults systems. A “family
impact perspective” on policymaking informs this report. Just as policymakers routinely consider the environmental
or economic impact of policies and programs, Family Impact Seminars help policymakers examine impact on
families by providing research fi ndings and evidence-based strategies.
Th is report consists of five briefs:
Brief 1 provides background and recent history on the handling of adolescent off enders in the United
States and North Carolina; a description of how the current North Carolina juvenile justice system works;
recent North Carolina juvenile justice statistics; and information on programs and facilities for adolescent
off enders in North Carolina and other states.
Brief 2 discusses research on youth development pertaining to three
issues central to policies for adolescent off enders: blameworthiness,
competence to stand trial, and the potential for an adolescent’s
character to change.
Brief 3 details how other states treat adolescent off enders.
Brief 4 discusses research on how juvenile crime rates respond to
changes in punishment laws.
Brief 5 presents three policy options and a series of further
considerations.
Th e briefi ng report concludes with a glossary, a list of acronyms, a list of
additional resources,and a chart of the current legal age in NC for diff erent
activities.

juveniles housed in detention centers are awaiting an adjudicatory or dispositional hearing.
Four NC counties (Durham, Forsyth, Guilford, and
Mecklenburg) operate their own detention centers. The DOC has two main correctional institutions for
“youthful off enders.” Th ese facilities, where juveniles transferred to adult court are housed after conviction, are
Western Youth Institution (WYI) in Morganton (males only) and North Carolina Correctional Institute for
Women (NCCIW) in Raleigh (females only). Inmates at
WYI range in age from 13 to 25. (Historically, youthful offenders in DOC are off enders 21 years of age and under.
The inclusion of off enders ages 22 to 25 is a product of the declining youthful off ender population and the use of the
available space for older inmates.) NCCIW houses female inmates of all ages. DOC strives to separate older and younger inmates in both institutions.

North Carolina has three types of facilities for adolescent offenders: youth development centers, detention centers,
and correctional institutions.21 NCDJJDP operates five youth development centers and nine detention centers.
Th e NC Department of Correction (DOC) operates correctional institutions. Both departments also operate community-based services.

Youth development centers house off enders age 10 to 21 for one year, on average, and provide youth mentoring, education,
and treatment, with an emphasis on rehabilitation. In recent
years, NCDJJDP has adopted a number of evidence-based therapeutic programs in youth development centers.
Detention centers have fewer and more limited services and staff than youth development centers since the
majority of.
All off ending 16- and 17-year-olds would continue to be tried in the adult criminal system, regardless of their crime. If convicted, 16- and 17-year-olds would be sentenced in adult courts and would have permanent criminal records, unless they petition the
court to have their record expunged.

Note: Under current North Carolina law, expungement is available only for misdemeanor off enses committed prior to age 18, except for misdemeanor possession of
alcohol or drugs, and one, low-level felony for simple possession of cocaine.
Programming, treatment, and other services for
16- and 17-year-olds would continue to be operated by the Department of Correction and are similar to
those available to adults. Some of these services are designed specifi cally for youthful off enders.
Some Resource Considerations
Resources could remain at current levels; however,
state DOC officials would need to continue to develop programming for adolescent off enders and may be responsible for meeting federal requirements
for mental health, social services, and education.
Over the past few years, the NCDJJDP has been developing a continuum of evidence-based services, many of which are appropriate for 16- and 17-yearold
offenders. The services would generally not beavailable to young off enders in the adult system.

http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital_library/resource_658.pdf

Jacksonville FLA. 12 Year Old Faces Life In Prison

JACKSONVILLE, FLA. – The 1st degree murder defendant, with relatives in the Dominican Republic, wears inmate-orange and handcuffs inside the courtroom.

Every police officer is taller than him. As are all of the other criminal defendants. The judge, as well.

This defendant is the youngest person to ever be charged as an adult with murder in Jacksonville, Florida.

He is 12 years old.

If convicted, could spend the rest of his life in prison. His name is Cristian Fernandez.

“Yes, I have compassion for Cristian Fernandez, but it's not my job to forgive,” says Florida State Attorney Angela Corey. “It's my job to follow the law."

Police say Cristian Fernandez used premeditation and intentionally killed his brother David by violently shoving the two-year old into a bookshelf, twice, causing a skull fracture and massive internal bleeding.

The medical examiner ruled David’s cause of death as homicide, by blunt force trauma. The mother of both children, 25 year old Bianela Susana, is also in jail, unable to post her $1 million bond. She’s charged with aggravated manslaughter of a child and felony child abuse and, if convicted, she faces 30 years in prison.

Allegedly, 12-year-old Cristian has confessed.

But on his behalf, there is international outrage. More than 170,000 people have signed an online petition, urging the prosecutor to treat the 12 year old as a juvenile, not as an adult. The prosecutor disagrees, and says Florida law is Florida law.

The Sunshine State sends more juveniles into the adult prison population than any other state. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 2009, 393 Florida juveniles entered adult prison, followed by Connecticut with 332, North Carolina with 215, New York with 190, Arizona with 157 and Texas with 156.

“He’s just a kid,” says Alicia Torres. Her son was a classmate of Cristian Fernandez. She signed the petition, too.

"He's a child. He's got a baby face,” says Torres. “He doesn't know - he doesn't know what's going on."

Complicating the Fernandez case is the role of the mother, Susana. Police say during the several hour window between when David was injured and she drove him to the hospital, her laptop shows that she searched what to do about an unconscious boy, checked her bank and downloaded music, before finally taking 2 year old David to the hospital.

A doctor at St. Luke’s told a police officer that had 2 year old David been treated sooner, he may have survived.

Twelve-year-old Cristian Fernandez’ public defenders believe all of the blame belongs with the mother.

" I think many would argue that she's the most culpable when it comes to the death of this child, says Matt Shirk."

In light of a plea deal that may spare this 140 pound murder defendant from the adult system, Fernandez will next be in court October 31st. His trial date has not yet been set.

The mother, Susana, goes on trial February 27th, 2012.

Phil Keating is national correspondent for Fox News Channel out of the Miami bureau.

Follow us on twitter.com/foxnewslatino




Read more: http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2011/10/19/child-murder-suspect-cristian-fernandezs-case-sparks-outrage/#ixzz1eW5cbIU8

NOTE>UPDATE>Cristian Fernandez | jacksonville.com





jacksonville.com/news/crime/cristian-fernandez


Prosecutors offer murder plea to Cristian Fernandez; defense plans to reject it.