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When A Child Is Worth More Than The Worst Mistake He Ever Made:
A Juvenile Lifer's Story:
By Antonio Maurice Howard:
showard3387@gmail.com
This is a vivid and compelling story about redemption,growth,tragady,uncertainy,& forgiveness:
A Memoir Of An Adolescent & His Life In Adult Prison:
Showing posts with label Teens Doing Life Without Parole. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Teens Doing Life Without Parole. Show all posts
Tuesday, October 11, 2016
Monday, January 25, 2016
Retroactively Appling Ban On LWOP For Kids
United States Supreme Court Rules Miller v. Alabama Is Retroactive
January 25, 2016
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The United States Supreme Court today decided that states must retroactively apply the ban on mandatory death-in-prison sentences for juveniles.
In 2012, EJI lawyers argued at the Supreme Court that sentencing kids to life in prison without parole for any offense is cruel and unusual punishment, relying on the Court's recognition that children are less culpable than adults because of their unique immaturity, impulsiveness, vulnerability, and capacity for redemption and rehabilitation. On June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court issued an historic ruling in Miller v. Alabama, holding that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for all children 17 or younger convicted of homicide are unconstitutional. The Court wrote that requiring sentencers to consider “children’s diminished culpability, and heightened capacity for change” should make such sentences “uncommon.”
Most state courts, including the highest courts of Arkansas, Nebraska, Connecticut, Florida, New Hampshire, Illinois, Mississippi, Iowa, Massachusetts, Texas, and Wyoming, as well as federal courts across the country, applied Miller retroactively to people already serving the banned sentence and granted them new sentencing hearings, but a handful of states, including Louisiana, refused to do so.
Today's decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana now requires all states to apply Miller retroactively, which means that in Louisiana, Alabama, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Minnesota, and Colorado, hundreds of people who were sentenced to die in prison for crimes when they were children are now entitled to new sentencing hearings.
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy explained that Miller is retroactive because it announced a substantive rule of constitutional law. Because Miller bars life without parole sentences for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, "it rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for 'a class of defendants because of their status' -- that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth."
The Court underscored why Miller is a substantive rule: "Before Miller, every juvenile convicted of a homicide offense could be sentenced to life without parole. After Miller, it will be the rare juvenile offender who can receive that same sentence."
People serving juvenile life-without-parole sentences must now be afforded hearings where "youth and its attendant characteristics" are considered as sentencing factors. Alternatively, the Court wrote that states "may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them."
Importantly, states must provide an opportunity for release "to those who demonstrate the truth of Miller's central intuition -- that children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change."
Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana
January 25, 2016
Print E-Mail Share
The United States Supreme Court today decided that states must retroactively apply the ban on mandatory death-in-prison sentences for juveniles.
In 2012, EJI lawyers argued at the Supreme Court that sentencing kids to life in prison without parole for any offense is cruel and unusual punishment, relying on the Court's recognition that children are less culpable than adults because of their unique immaturity, impulsiveness, vulnerability, and capacity for redemption and rehabilitation. On June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court issued an historic ruling in Miller v. Alabama, holding that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for all children 17 or younger convicted of homicide are unconstitutional. The Court wrote that requiring sentencers to consider “children’s diminished culpability, and heightened capacity for change” should make such sentences “uncommon.”
Most state courts, including the highest courts of Arkansas, Nebraska, Connecticut, Florida, New Hampshire, Illinois, Mississippi, Iowa, Massachusetts, Texas, and Wyoming, as well as federal courts across the country, applied Miller retroactively to people already serving the banned sentence and granted them new sentencing hearings, but a handful of states, including Louisiana, refused to do so.
Today's decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana now requires all states to apply Miller retroactively, which means that in Louisiana, Alabama, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Minnesota, and Colorado, hundreds of people who were sentenced to die in prison for crimes when they were children are now entitled to new sentencing hearings.
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy explained that Miller is retroactive because it announced a substantive rule of constitutional law. Because Miller bars life without parole sentences for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, "it rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for 'a class of defendants because of their status' -- that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth."
The Court underscored why Miller is a substantive rule: "Before Miller, every juvenile convicted of a homicide offense could be sentenced to life without parole. After Miller, it will be the rare juvenile offender who can receive that same sentence."
People serving juvenile life-without-parole sentences must now be afforded hearings where "youth and its attendant characteristics" are considered as sentencing factors. Alternatively, the Court wrote that states "may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them."
Importantly, states must provide an opportunity for release "to those who demonstrate the truth of Miller's central intuition -- that children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change."
Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana
Saturday, December 19, 2015
Parole For Young Lifers
SB 260 AND 261; THE SAME, BUT DIFFERENT
January, 2016 will herald the implementation of SB 261, which extends the factors of Youth Offender Parole Hearings (YOPH) to those lifers and long-serving determinate sentenced prisoners who were under 23 years old at the time of their crime. And while the factors of eligibility for the two bills are the same (under 23, not a sex crime, no conviction for additional serious/sex crime after the age of 23 and having served a minimum time, based on sentence) the timing of those coming to parole hearings under 261 will be substantially different..
Under the original YOPH bill, SB 260, the BPH had a total of 18 months to bring everyone affected by the bill to a parole hearing. This feat was accomplished, but not without fallout. Specifically, many determinate sentenced prisoners, coming to their first ever parole hearing in the last 6 months of the implementation period, were unprepared, both from a programming and rehabilitation standpoint, resulting is a dismal 5% grant rate for this cohort. And, because of the increased number of CRAs required, the FAD fell behind in preparing the evaluations, causing many prisoners to face their hearing with a CRA they had received mere days earlier.
Because of these findings, and because the number of prisoners potentially impacted under SB 261 is so large (an early estimate is perhaps 9,700) the legislature passed a companion bill to SB 261, SB 519, which allows for considerable alternation in the original time frame for hearings to take place. The two bills were passed out of the legislature together, signed by Gov. Brown on the same day and will go into effect in unison.
Instead of 18 months the BPH will now have two full years to bring all life term inmates who qualify for YOPH under the new age considerations to a hearing, either initial or subsequent. The hearings for lifers under 261 will begin in January, 2016 and must take place by the end of 2017. For those DSL inmates who qualify for 261, the board now has until the end of 2021 to bring those individuals to a parole hearing.
And while possibly waiting an additional 6 months in the case of lifers, or a few more years in the case of DSL inmates, might seem disappointing at first SB 261 still has the potential to cut years off a lifer’s sentence and for those DSL inmates serving impossibly long, virtual toe-tag sentences, 261 can be a real life-line. The additional time will also, it is anticipated, allow the FAD to complete and provide the required CRAs in a more timely fashion.
There are other, less impactful differences and nuances in the two bills as well as new procedures for implementing SB 261, all of which are too lengthy to detail in a short newsletter. Specifics of these details are being sent to prisons, for dissemination to the inmate population, and for the edification of correctional counselors. Whether or not the information actually reaches inmates is anyone’s guess.
The BPH has prepared a comprehensive 3 page explanation of these new developments, covering many areas of concern, including how notifications will be made, who will determine eligibility for inclusion in SB 261, how the new bill will affect PTA and other hearing scheduling matters. LSA will forward this document to any inmate who requests the report, along with explanatory notations on each section. More, in depth information will also be available in the December issue of CLN.
We can also provide an explanation of consultation hearings, which will be occurring for many inmates in the coming months in preparation for eventual consideration under YOPH. There is no charge for this information, however, stamps or SASE are helpful to our staff and budget.
Please send your requests to: LSA, PO BOX 277, Rancho Cordova, Ca. 95741 and mark the outer envelope : SB 261/519.
As previously announced, beginning in January CRAs will be done every 3 years instead of every 5 years and no Supplemental Risk Assessments will be done..
January, 2016 will herald the implementation of SB 261, which extends the factors of Youth Offender Parole Hearings (YOPH) to those lifers and long-serving determinate sentenced prisoners who were under 23 years old at the time of their crime. And while the factors of eligibility for the two bills are the same (under 23, not a sex crime, no conviction for additional serious/sex crime after the age of 23 and having served a minimum time, based on sentence) the timing of those coming to parole hearings under 261 will be substantially different..
Under the original YOPH bill, SB 260, the BPH had a total of 18 months to bring everyone affected by the bill to a parole hearing. This feat was accomplished, but not without fallout. Specifically, many determinate sentenced prisoners, coming to their first ever parole hearing in the last 6 months of the implementation period, were unprepared, both from a programming and rehabilitation standpoint, resulting is a dismal 5% grant rate for this cohort. And, because of the increased number of CRAs required, the FAD fell behind in preparing the evaluations, causing many prisoners to face their hearing with a CRA they had received mere days earlier.
Because of these findings, and because the number of prisoners potentially impacted under SB 261 is so large (an early estimate is perhaps 9,700) the legislature passed a companion bill to SB 261, SB 519, which allows for considerable alternation in the original time frame for hearings to take place. The two bills were passed out of the legislature together, signed by Gov. Brown on the same day and will go into effect in unison.
Instead of 18 months the BPH will now have two full years to bring all life term inmates who qualify for YOPH under the new age considerations to a hearing, either initial or subsequent. The hearings for lifers under 261 will begin in January, 2016 and must take place by the end of 2017. For those DSL inmates who qualify for 261, the board now has until the end of 2021 to bring those individuals to a parole hearing.
And while possibly waiting an additional 6 months in the case of lifers, or a few more years in the case of DSL inmates, might seem disappointing at first SB 261 still has the potential to cut years off a lifer’s sentence and for those DSL inmates serving impossibly long, virtual toe-tag sentences, 261 can be a real life-line. The additional time will also, it is anticipated, allow the FAD to complete and provide the required CRAs in a more timely fashion.
There are other, less impactful differences and nuances in the two bills as well as new procedures for implementing SB 261, all of which are too lengthy to detail in a short newsletter. Specifics of these details are being sent to prisons, for dissemination to the inmate population, and for the edification of correctional counselors. Whether or not the information actually reaches inmates is anyone’s guess.
The BPH has prepared a comprehensive 3 page explanation of these new developments, covering many areas of concern, including how notifications will be made, who will determine eligibility for inclusion in SB 261, how the new bill will affect PTA and other hearing scheduling matters. LSA will forward this document to any inmate who requests the report, along with explanatory notations on each section. More, in depth information will also be available in the December issue of CLN.
We can also provide an explanation of consultation hearings, which will be occurring for many inmates in the coming months in preparation for eventual consideration under YOPH. There is no charge for this information, however, stamps or SASE are helpful to our staff and budget.
Please send your requests to: LSA, PO BOX 277, Rancho Cordova, Ca. 95741 and mark the outer envelope : SB 261/519.
As previously announced, beginning in January CRAs will be done every 3 years instead of every 5 years and no Supplemental Risk Assessments will be done..
Wednesday, April 1, 2015
California has long led the world in juvenile injustice
California Rightly Revisits Its Tough-on-Youth-Crime Stance''
California has long led the world in juvenile injustice. Just five years ago, when there were only seven people outside the U.S. serving life prison terms with no possibility of parole for crimes they had committed before they became adults, California had more than 200.
They were locked up with no hope for eventual release largely because of cruel and costly laws adopted in a frenzy of anti-crime sentiment in the 1980s and 1990s. Rising gang crime fueled fears that juveniles had somehow become inhuman and deranged a belief likely bolstered by the fact that California voters were disproportionately older and white, while the youths being charged with violent crimes were disproportionately Latino and African American. The cultural gap may have made it easier for voters to see juvenile offenders and their families as alien to society rather than an integral part of it.
A 1990 anti-crime ballot measure made life-without-parole sentences the norm for killers, and many other offenders, under 18. Teenagers who committed crimes could be written off and imprisoned as forever beyond redemption.
The tough-on-youth-crime stance ignored a growing body of scientific research demonstrating that teenagers simply don’t have brains that are sufficiently developed to provide the kinds of judgment and impulse controls expected of adults.
Gradually, leaders and lawmakers here came to realize that it was unjust to lock up people for crimes committed in their youth without leaving even the slightest chance for parole, regardless of their underdeveloped mental and emotional state at the time of the crime, regardless of any reckoning or responsibility gained over the course of their imprisonment.
Finally, in 2012, the law changed. The prison doors were not thrown open; on the contrary, the new law merely allowed such inmates who had already served at least 15 years to ask judges to change their sentences to allow parole hearings. If the judge agrees, parole can still be denied, and even if it is granted the governor can overturn the decision. But youthful offenders, aging in prison, gained at least a chance at freedom.
On Wednesday, Edel Gonzalez, now in his 30s, became the first person released from a California prison under the new law. An Orange County judge, the parole board and the governor were convinced that the person who committed a senseless killing at 16 had grown to understand the immorality of his act, had been punished, had been rehabilitated and was no danger to society.
It would be all the more cruel and unusual to deny a parole hearing to people merely because their horrendous juvenile mistakes were committed in the distant past.
The successful process shows that California, too, has grown beyond senselessness in its sentencing laws although it was not ahead of the national curve. Over the last decade, the U.S. Supreme Court has demonstrated an evolving understanding of the essential differences between adolescents and adults.
In 2005, the justices ruled that it was unconstitutional for a state to put a person to death for a murder committed as a minor. Just as juveniles cannot be entrusted with the rights and responsibilities of adults, given that they lack an adult’s judgment and maturity, they cannot be held to answer for their crimes to the same degree that an adult can, the court reasoned. They could be imprisoned, but not executed.
The same reasoning applied in 2010, when the court struck down sentences of life without even the possibility of parole for crimes — other than murder — that perpetrators committed while still juveniles. The justices ruled that such offenders should be able to at least have a chance to request parole, sometime in their adult years, after demonstrating remorse and working to make amends.
In 2012, the court ruled again, this time applying their previous reasoning to most murder convictions. If the basis for the earlier rulings was that juveniles lack an adult’s capacity to reason and to act responsibly, the fact that the crime was especially egregious doesn’t change that. Not every life without parole sentence for a killing committed in the perpetrator’s youth is now necessarily deemed cruel and unusual, but courts must consider the mitigating circumstances, including age.
And how about juveniles sentenced before the 2012 ruling? In December, the court agreed to consider whether its ruling should apply to states retroactively. But the case became moot in January, when the inmate in the case the justices were considering was released from a Louisiana prison. On Monday, though, they took another case that calls on them to answer the same question.
On the merits, the answer should be easy: If a life-without-parole sentence for a crime committed while the perpetrator was a juvenile is cruel and unusual punishment for anyone sentenced after the 2012 decision, it’s just as much a constitutional violation for anyone who has been serving such a sentence for years or even decades.
The court’s decision hinges in part on procedural rules defining when states can make such decisions for themselves. As the justices work through those rules, though, they should keep the substance of the constitutional question foremost in their minds. It would be all the more cruel and unusual to deny a parole hearing to people merely because their horrendous juvenile mistakes were committed in the distant past instead of recently.
California, meanwhile, is still no leader in more enlightened approaches to the sentencing of juvenile offenders. Despite the state law allowing them to seek resentencing, the state now has more than 300 inmates serving life without parole for offenses they committed before adulthood. California courts and lawmakers are waiting for the high court to decide whether a practice deemed cruel and unusual nevertheless remains permissible when applied to people locked up before 2012
California has long led the world in juvenile injustice. Just five years ago, when there were only seven people outside the U.S. serving life prison terms with no possibility of parole for crimes they had committed before they became adults, California had more than 200.
They were locked up with no hope for eventual release largely because of cruel and costly laws adopted in a frenzy of anti-crime sentiment in the 1980s and 1990s. Rising gang crime fueled fears that juveniles had somehow become inhuman and deranged a belief likely bolstered by the fact that California voters were disproportionately older and white, while the youths being charged with violent crimes were disproportionately Latino and African American. The cultural gap may have made it easier for voters to see juvenile offenders and their families as alien to society rather than an integral part of it.
A 1990 anti-crime ballot measure made life-without-parole sentences the norm for killers, and many other offenders, under 18. Teenagers who committed crimes could be written off and imprisoned as forever beyond redemption.
The tough-on-youth-crime stance ignored a growing body of scientific research demonstrating that teenagers simply don’t have brains that are sufficiently developed to provide the kinds of judgment and impulse controls expected of adults.
Gradually, leaders and lawmakers here came to realize that it was unjust to lock up people for crimes committed in their youth without leaving even the slightest chance for parole, regardless of their underdeveloped mental and emotional state at the time of the crime, regardless of any reckoning or responsibility gained over the course of their imprisonment.
Finally, in 2012, the law changed. The prison doors were not thrown open; on the contrary, the new law merely allowed such inmates who had already served at least 15 years to ask judges to change their sentences to allow parole hearings. If the judge agrees, parole can still be denied, and even if it is granted the governor can overturn the decision. But youthful offenders, aging in prison, gained at least a chance at freedom.
On Wednesday, Edel Gonzalez, now in his 30s, became the first person released from a California prison under the new law. An Orange County judge, the parole board and the governor were convinced that the person who committed a senseless killing at 16 had grown to understand the immorality of his act, had been punished, had been rehabilitated and was no danger to society.
It would be all the more cruel and unusual to deny a parole hearing to people merely because their horrendous juvenile mistakes were committed in the distant past.
The successful process shows that California, too, has grown beyond senselessness in its sentencing laws although it was not ahead of the national curve. Over the last decade, the U.S. Supreme Court has demonstrated an evolving understanding of the essential differences between adolescents and adults.
In 2005, the justices ruled that it was unconstitutional for a state to put a person to death for a murder committed as a minor. Just as juveniles cannot be entrusted with the rights and responsibilities of adults, given that they lack an adult’s judgment and maturity, they cannot be held to answer for their crimes to the same degree that an adult can, the court reasoned. They could be imprisoned, but not executed.
The same reasoning applied in 2010, when the court struck down sentences of life without even the possibility of parole for crimes — other than murder — that perpetrators committed while still juveniles. The justices ruled that such offenders should be able to at least have a chance to request parole, sometime in their adult years, after demonstrating remorse and working to make amends.
In 2012, the court ruled again, this time applying their previous reasoning to most murder convictions. If the basis for the earlier rulings was that juveniles lack an adult’s capacity to reason and to act responsibly, the fact that the crime was especially egregious doesn’t change that. Not every life without parole sentence for a killing committed in the perpetrator’s youth is now necessarily deemed cruel and unusual, but courts must consider the mitigating circumstances, including age.
And how about juveniles sentenced before the 2012 ruling? In December, the court agreed to consider whether its ruling should apply to states retroactively. But the case became moot in January, when the inmate in the case the justices were considering was released from a Louisiana prison. On Monday, though, they took another case that calls on them to answer the same question.
On the merits, the answer should be easy: If a life-without-parole sentence for a crime committed while the perpetrator was a juvenile is cruel and unusual punishment for anyone sentenced after the 2012 decision, it’s just as much a constitutional violation for anyone who has been serving such a sentence for years or even decades.
The court’s decision hinges in part on procedural rules defining when states can make such decisions for themselves. As the justices work through those rules, though, they should keep the substance of the constitutional question foremost in their minds. It would be all the more cruel and unusual to deny a parole hearing to people merely because their horrendous juvenile mistakes were committed in the distant past instead of recently.
California, meanwhile, is still no leader in more enlightened approaches to the sentencing of juvenile offenders. Despite the state law allowing them to seek resentencing, the state now has more than 300 inmates serving life without parole for offenses they committed before adulthood. California courts and lawmakers are waiting for the high court to decide whether a practice deemed cruel and unusual nevertheless remains permissible when applied to people locked up before 2012
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